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Brett Christophers The Great Leveler: Capitalism and Competition in the Court of 
Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016) 
 
What role does law play vis-à-vis Đapitalisŵ͛s iŶhereŶt teŶdeŶĐǇ toǁards Đrisis? This 
is the subject of Brett Christophers͛ book The Great Leveler. The ďook͛s main 
oďjeĐtiǀe is to deŵoŶstrate the laǁ͛s historical and contemporary role in regulating 
capitalism such that it remains stable and continues to reproduce itself profitably. 
Law, Christophers argues, functions in such a way as to level out, or redress, 
historical imbalances and tensions in what he calls the monopoly-competition 
dialectic that destabilise capital accumulation. This is achieved through two forms of 
law – intellectual property (IP) and antitrust/competition (A/C) law. Thus, during 
periods of excessive competition (characterised, inter alia, by low prices and 
dwindling profits), IP law becomes prominent and works to temper this by 
facilitating and protecting the monopoly side of the dialectic; in times of excessive 
monopoly power (associated with stagnation, rent-seeking, and low wages), A/C law 
kicks in to ameliorate this, thereby restoring harmony to the dialectic. While 
Christophers notes that those two forms of law have not been solely responsible for 
levelling out those imbalances, in his view their role in this regard has been of 
paramount importance. It is the neglect of this role – iŶdeed of laǁ͛s role geŶerallǇ 
vis-à-vis political economy – in the existing literature that The Great Leveler is 
designed to highlight and rectify. 
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The ďook͛s first Part – ͚LeǀeliŶg iŶ TheorǇ͛ – sets out the conceptual framework 
ǁithiŶ ǁhiĐh the disĐussioŶ of laǁ͛s practical role in managing the monopoly-
competition dialectic in Part II. Christophers locates this fraŵeǁork iŶ Marǆ͛s 
conceptualisation of capitalism as, in Christophers͛ words, ͚alǁaǇs, ŶeĐessarilǇ, 
teetering on a knife edge, balanced precariously between the contradictory forces of 
competition and monopoly, and perennially in danger of lapsing too far to one side 
or the other.͛ Unlike those – including Adam Smith – who consider competition and 
monopoly as separate, unrelated entities, Christophers deploǇs Marǆ͛s ŶotioŶ of the 
relation between the two as dynamic and dialectical – monopoly is essential for the 
production of competition, just as competition inevitably creates monopoly. The 
resulting assumption is that the reproduction of capitalism depends upon an albeit 
unstable balance always being struck between the two. As David Harvey, to whom 
Christophers refers, has it, the challenge for capital is to keep economic relations 
suffiĐieŶtlǇ Đoŵpetitiǀe ǁithout jeopardisiŶg ͚the iŶdiǀidual aŶd Đlass ŵoŶopolǇ 
privileges of private property that are the foundation of capitalism as a political-
eĐoŶoŵiĐ sǇsteŵ͛. 
 
In the final chapter of Part I, Christophers sets out a conceptual understanding of 
A/C law and IP law that mirrors the dialectical relation of competition and monopoly. 
Like the latter relation, those laws are not to be viewed in an oppositional way, but 
as dynamic and as having a common objective. While each functions to correct 
excessive shifts in the directions of monopoly (A/C law) or competition (IP law), in 
doing so they work towards the shared goal of maintaining capitalism͛s ďalaŶĐe aŶd 
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reproducibility. More specifically, Christophers identifies exchange relations, rather 
than production, as the target of these laws͛ intervention (though he notes that the 
two are not discrete, as alterations in the former have consequences for the latter). 
Thus, on the one hand, A/C law endeavours to tackle market power, thereby 
reducing monopoly prices and profits; whereas, on the other hand, IP law, through 
its construction of monopoly power, intervenes in exchange relations in order to 
address the opposite threat to capital – namely, low profit margins that 
disincentivise investment. 
 
In Part II of the book, Christophers focuses on the US and UK in order to present a 
historical analysis of how, practically, A/C and IP law have contributed to the success 
of capitalism by ensuring monopoly and competition approximate as closely as 
possible to a state of harmony. The chapters in this Part cover three eras during the 
twentieth century when, according to Christophers, laǁ had a ͚leǀelliŶg͛ effeĐt oŶ 
Anglo-American capitalist political economy. The first period is the beginning of the 
twentieth century when law worked to redress the excessive competition that had 
developed in the latter decades of the nineteenth century and its detrimental 
economic effects, by strengthening monopoly power. The second era relates to the 
period between post-WWII and the mid-1970s – the so-Đalled ͚Đapitalist goldeŶ age͛ 
– in which competition law sought to address what by then had become a state of 
affairs in which monopoly power reigned and was having negative effects such as 
reduced demand and a weakened labour force. Christophers traces how law shifted 
from shoring up monopoly power to supporting competition – the change lying in 
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both the different role of A/C law (in the UK, the very coming into existence of 
competition law) and a new interpretation by members of the judiciary of the 
relationship between IP law and A/C law, such that the application of IP law 
functioned to facilitate competition. Christophers also identifies the impact of 
ǀarious ͚politiĐal-eĐoŶoŵiĐ ageŶts͛ that enabled this shift to competition to 
materialise. The measure of redressing balance in the dialectic in the UK during this 
period was the empowerment of labour, identified in its greater share of income. By 
stimulating increased levels of competition, A/C law played a crucial role in this 
outcome. 
 
Finally, Christophers characterises the period from the mid-1970s to the present as 
one of a return to monopoly power, though unlike earlier in the twentieth century, 
this is now characterised by its greater degree of internationalisation and foreign 
competition. Taking the US and the UK as examples of this transformation, 
Christophers once again stresses its political-economic dimension – namely the 
imbalance, in favour of competition, that now existed in the competition-monopoly 
dialeĐtiĐ aŶd the threat this posed to Đapitalisŵ͛s reproduĐtioŶ aŶd staďilitǇ as profit 
margins declined and levels of innovation and investment stagnated. Once more, 
Christophers argues that the law came to the rescue by supporting monopoly 
through the greater emphasis placed on IP law. 
 
The Great Leveler has several strengths, only two of which are noted here. First, and 
at a general level, it explores a crucial, though often neglected issue today – namely, 
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the nature of the relationship between law and capitalism. And it does so in a way 
that provides a much needed and refreshing antidote to the type of law and 
economics literature founded upon an unwavering devotion to the diktats of 
neoclassical economics. Against this, Christophers͛ ďook offers a ĐritiĐal approaĐh to 
laǁ aŶd politiĐal eĐoŶoŵǇ grouŶded iŶ Marǆ͛s ǁork aŶd that of those – such as 
David Harvey – whom Marx has inspired. This allows Christophers to tie up his 
account of the dialectical nature of competition and monopoly to questions such as 
profit margins and the (dis)empowerment of labour, while also taking to task a form 
of Marxism too focused on questions of, and assumptions about, the capitalist class 
and its instrumental use of the law. Secondly, the ďook͛s strength lies in its emphasis 
on the historical role played by a range of factors in the shifting importance of A/C 
and IP law, and the corresponding dominance of competition and monopoly power, 
in different eras. Thus, institutions, legal doctrine, judicial personality, developments 
in academic thinking (e.g. the influence of the Chicago School of Economics both in 
the US and the EU) and their influence on legal practice, political lobbying aimed at 
altering the form and enforcement of IP and A/C laws, as well as economic 
imperatives – for Christophers, all had, and have, their role to play in understanding 
the shifts in the balance of competition and monopoly across the three eras 
discussed in the book. The ďook͛s ŵethodologǇ is therefore multifaceted and 




Given these strengths, it is surprising that Christophers does not draw on a rich 
history of literature in the sociology of law that explores the relationship between 
law and capitalism. For instance, it is interesting that there is no mention of Max 
Weďer͛s ǁork oŶ the relatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ laǁ aŶd the rise of Đapitalism. The idea 
that there is an affinity between law and capitalism/the needs of capitalists, rather 
than a unidirectional causal relationship in which movements in the economy 
determine changes in the law (the classic Marxist understanding of law); the 
importance of changes internal to the law itself, including in legal education/training 
and the status needs of the legal profession, and how these play an important part in 
determining the form of law that emerged as capitalism developed – all of these 
seeŵ releǀaŶt to Christophers͛ analysis and understanding of the relationship 
between law and economy in the context he is writing about. For example, Weber 
identifies within formal rational law the types of features – including the need for 
predictability and stability – that Christophers highlights as being critical to the 
levelling function of the law vis-à-vis capitalism. At one stage, he speaks of ͚the 
competition-laǁ ǁorldǀieǁ aŶd … its ĐalĐulatiǀe aŶd legislatiǀe praĐtiĐe͛, calculability 
being one of the key characteristics identified by Weber in his analysis of the type of 
legal system required by economic agents. Thus, ǁhile Christophers͛ conceptual 
understanding of A/C and IP law, and their dialectical relation, is grounded in Marx, 
for this reviewer his rich, nuanced historical analysis in Part II of the book owes at 
least as ŵuĐh, if Ŷot ŵore, to Weďer͛s soĐiologǇ of laǁ aŶd its intricate, wide-
ranging explanation of the relationship between law and capitalism. 
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A final observation relates to the faith that the argument can sometimes be seen to 
place in the remedial functions of the law ;at oŶe poiŶt, Christophers saǇs that ͚laǁ 
oŶĐe agaiŶ Đaŵe to the resĐue͛Ϳ. Laǁ, iŶ Christophers͛ Ŷarratiǀe, is characterised as a 
solver of problems, tackling crises in capitalism by reigning in excessive 
ĐoŵpetitioŶ/ŵoŶopolǇ ǀia the deploǇŵeŶt of IP or A/C laǁ. Laǁ͛s fuŶĐtioŶ is to 
restore balance between the two – to level, iŶ Christophers͛ phrase. But ǁhat of 
laǁ͛s possiďle role iŶ the produĐtioŶ of the Đrises Christophers argues it is designed 
to tackle? If an excess of, say, monopoly power ultimately results from a situation in 
which IP law has been applied to redress excessive competition, to what extent 
might the law itself be complicit in creating capitalist crises or imbalances in the 
monopoly-competition dialectic? Thus, is laǁ͛s role iŶ this ĐoŶteǆt solelǇ to ďe 
equated with the great leveler; or does the inextricable, reciprocal link between law 
and political economy that Christophers advocates potentially result in law operating 
to create the very imbalances in the monopoly-competition dialectic that it seeks to 
redress? 
 
The foregoing observations are simply that and do not detract in any way from what 
is a very interesting, impeccably researched, and important book that makes a 
significant contribution – both theoretically and empirically – to the literature on 
laǁ͛s relatioŶship to Đapitalisŵ. 
